The growing technical complexity of and increased cost pressure on deep-space science missions poses challenges for the system engineering discipline of mission validation and verification (V&V). In the wake of several recent mission failures, the aerospace community is still searching for a stable middle ground between the highly-reliable yet cost-prohibitive approaches of the past and cheaper but excessively risky methods of project implementation. The key components of a robust mission level V&V program are presented, with attention on the guiding principles and considerations. The concept that a V&V program should be "three dimensional" is discussed (e.g., the end-to-end aspect or width, the top-to-bottom aspect or depth, and the project life-cycle aspect or time). Distinctions are made between definition-phase requirements validation and implementation-phase system validation and verifzcution. The role of modeling and simulation relative to system testing and the necessity of model validation are described. Validation of system robustness using techniques such as performance sensitivity analysis, system fault tree analysis, probabilistic risk analysis, and stress testing is explored. Finally, a summary V&V "checklist" is provided.
Introduction
In 1997, the same year NASA's $3 billion Cassini spacecraft began its long voyage to Saturn, a fhdamental change in the approach for hture space-science missions was heralded with the successful landing of the $165M Mars Pathfinder mission. NASA's near-term (2003-201 3) deep-space exploration program encompasses many new missions in various stages of planning or development, the most mature of which are shown in Table 1 . This suite of projects includes the relatively low-cost (<$150M) New Millennium Program, moderately priced ($300-$650M) Discovery, Mars Scout, and New Frontier missions, and a unique set of larger ($lOOOM+) missions associated with the Origins and Solar System Exploration Programs.' A dozen or so other deep-space missions are likewise being seriously considered or under development in the US and Europe.* With the proliferation of such missions, the community of engineers, 
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Terrestrial Planet Finder (TPF) scientists, and managers delivering them is still adapting to the new mode of projectimplementation. There is a need to find some stable middle ground between the very reliable but cost-prohibitive methods employed on Cassini, Galileo, and Voyager and the lower-cost missions currently in the queue. Designers are frequently forced away from costly redundant architectures and intensive ground-in-the-loop operations to less fault-tolerant, single-string architectures with significant on-board autonomy. Hence, the need for robustness (and proof of such robustness) has increased for hardware, software, and operational processes. Recent attempts to implement missions with the "faster, better, cheaper" (FBC) approach have suffered from mixed results. On the one hand, the Mars Pathfinder, Lunar Prospector, Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR), and Deep Space 1 (DS1) missions were successfully implemented in the FBC mode.
Genesis and StarDust continue to operate nominally after several years in space. However, those successes have been tempered by catastrophic failures of the Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO), Mars Polar Lander (MPL), Wide-field Infrared Explorer (WIRE), and Comet Nucleus Tour (CONTOUR) missions. This mixed track record encourages continued refinement of our project implementation practices to emphasize "success first", and in particular, the validation and verification (V&V) techniques needed to insure system robustness. One should also remember the lessons of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) and Mars Observer (MO), which proved that high cost does not always correlate with reduced risk. Lessons-learned reports for such missions repeatedly highlight the paramount importance of a thorough end-to-end V&V program when trying to balance risk and cost.
Increasing complexity of the missions being launched represents another important driver for V&V. The upcoming suite of deep-space missions requires dramatic new technologies in many cases. In the space-astronomy arena, missions are driving the state of the art in many areas: Kepler's few parts-per-million photometry, the Space Interferometry Mission (S1M)'s few micro-arcsecond astrometry, the Laser Interferometric Space Antenna (L1SA)'s fempto-G acceleration sensing, and the Terrestrial Planet Finder (TPF)'s ultra-high contrast (1 0-l') imaging needs are all setting new targets for performance. Getting new technologies such as pico-meter metrology, sub-angstrom optical wavefront control, and separated-spacecraft, cryogenic nulling interferometry to work on Earth is difficult enough. The V&V challenges associated with converting these to reliable, space-borne systems are formidable. Likewise, as the scope of NASA's Solar System Exploration Program expands, future missions to Mars and the outer planets drive the need for highly autonomous spacecraft remote-agents, realtime hazard sensing and avoidance in planetary landers, advanced propulsion and energy systems, and the ability to operate in extremely high radiation environments. Many of the above capabilities are cost-prohibitive or impractical to test in an end-to-end fashion prior to launch, thus placing an increased burden on modeling and simulation as part of a robust V&V program. There is also a caution here: projects faced with daunting technological challenges often succumb to tunnel vision and focus on "invention" while neglecting the more mundane aspects of the system, such as the spacecraft bus. Flight in deep-space is still far from routine. Projects must continue to apply significant attention to basic health and safety issues, such as fault tolerance and fault protection design and validation.
V&V : Definitions and Scope
While Independent Validation & Verification (IV&V) of software has received considerable attention recently, standards for the broader mission-level V&V activity are rather fuzzy (despite attempts by IS0 and other organizations), other than the mundane aspects of verification.* Likewise, the scale of mission-level V&V efforts and basic approach varies widely from project-to-project. In fact, there appears to be a cultural aspect of how V&V, and validation in particular, is treated in various organizations. Namely, "great system houses" are often adept at using validation to catch problems in the design phase whereas "great integration houses" have demonstrated an ability to find creative solutions for horrendous problems that arise late in the implementation phase.3 Missions have been successfully implemented by both cultures but the latter typically suffers from increased risk and higher costs (it's cheaper to correct problems earlier).
The following definitions are provided to illustrate the subtle but important distinctions between different aspects of a V&V program. The commonly-used phrase "Verification proves the design is right; validation proves it is the right design'' is correct but not very specific. The author has used a combination of sources including the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, IS0 9000 Handbook, and personal experience to refine the common definitions as f01lows.~ Verification is proof of compliance of the as-delivered system with specific requirements @e., "does what we built meet the requirements we wrote?"). While proving compliance with top-level performance requirements can sometimes be a challenging task, the basic concepts behind verification are fairly straightforward and universally recognized, such as the use of verification matrices. Validation is a more nebulous concept and can be broken into three sub-definitions: requirements validation, model validation, and system validation. Requirements Validation is proof that the requirements (and hence the system design) should satisfy the customer's Need or purpose before the system is actually built. Model Validation is proof that the models and simulations to be used for requirements and system validation are correct. System Validation is proof that the as-delivered system (all project elements operating end-toend in the expected flight environment with reasonable stressing conditions) will meet the driving Need @e., "does what we built meet the objectives?"). It is important to recognize these distinctions between Verification and Validation.
The structure of a generic V&V program is shown in Figure 1 . The driving Need is used to set the initial requirements and is frequently calibration (characterization) of the as-built referred back to as part of the validation system, analysis, modeling, and simulation of activity. Initial model validation is done to un-testable aspects, and inspection for others. ensure the modelshimulation can be used
The output of the V&V activity includes safely to support requirements validation. In updates to the V&V matrices and addition to performance analysis/modeling/ testhalibration data for updating the system simulation, requirements validation includes models and simulations (for potential future risk analysis such as Fault Tree Analyses and use in flight). When the V&V matrices are Probabilistic Risk Analyses to insure the complete, the system can finally be considered design will be robust against failures or offvalidated (should satisfy the Need). Of nominal situations. This will be discussed course, a system isn't truly 100% validated further in upcoming sections.
V&V until the mission is successfully operational requirements and a set of tracking matrices are but every project must strive to achieve a used to cover requirements validation, model reasonable confidence level before launch. validation, verification, and system validation.
The definition of reasonabze varies from System-level V&V, including roll-up from project to project' although most strive for > lower-level V&V, consist of testing and 90% confidence at launch. There is an end-to-end aspect of the mission that spans its entire hctional and performance space, which can be thought of dimensionally as width. For an astronomy mission this would consist of considering everything from photons incident at the aperture (including predicted characteristics of the source) through filtering and detection by the flight instrument(s), data storage and transmission by the spacecraft and deep space network, error correction and data reduction by the science data center, and analysishnterpretation by the science team, as well as the operational procedures used to implement the above process. Figure 2 provides a high-level snap-shot of this example (for the primary data flow path). The second dimension of a V&V program is the top-to-bottom aspect or depth. The familiar "V-model" in systems engineering (Figure 3 ) reflects the hierarchical structure of the mission and the process by which requirements are de-composed into suballocations and validated on the downstroke and then the design and as-built system are verified and validated on the ~pstroke.~ Whereas verification is typically performed at all levels, validation in its most rigorous and comprehensive form occurs at the system level. However, in a well-executed project, some validation is performed at all levels. For example, a designer of an electronic board NEED (Objectives) will typically perform a worst-case analysis to assess the design robustness to stressing conditions. Such lower-level validation activities are flowed upwards to the next level, playing a part in overall system validation.
The third dimension of a V&V program is time. The V&V program must span the entire project cycle, from formulation, definition, development, test, operations, and data reduction (phases A-E in NASA parlance). As shown in Figure 4 , the V&V program evolves over the project life cycle. It is also critical that validation address the full mission duration space, covering time-dependent factors and all scenarios. Note: while uplink command validation and software-patch validation are important parts of operations, they are considered peripheral to this discussion.
The various V&V activities will be explored further in upcoming sections, but first some comments about balancing cost vs risk are warranted. If the mission fails, we probably didn't spend enough effort on V&V. On the other hand, one can also bankrupt a project by being overly conservative. Clearly the risk posture varies from project to project and hence the percentage of total project cost appropriate for allocation to the V&V program. NASA's software IV&V program addresses this by designating which areas to apply formal V&V. Risk scores are estimated for each major software entity (risk defined as the combination of impact and probability of occurrence).6 For mission-level V&V, that risk rating system can be adapted to use the following factors when assessing the risk for each area: 
8) Amount of inheritance
For example, a mission with a single, fairly "self-contained" instrument (in terms of its ability to meet performance requirements without the help of external entities) is easier to design, simulate, and test than one with many, tightly-coupled or distributed instruments and space-craft subsystems and a complex ground data processing and error correction function. Also, the amount of available inheritance in a particular mission element has some bearing on the scope of V&V for that element. For example, if a certain model of gyroscope has repeatedly demonstrated flight-worthiness in terms of performance and robustness, in conditions similar to the new application, the gyro can be validated/verified by "similarity" and/or "analysis", thus saving cost on testing for that unit (although it still needs to be factored into system-level V&V effort).
The important point here is that the project must go through the exercise of drafting a V&V Plan early in definition phase and explore the above topics. Considering and agreeing on the overall risk posture and corresponding scope of the V&V program is essential to achieving the proper balance.
Requirements Validation: Approach & Techniques
In proving the system will meet the ultimate Need, validation must address several aspects of the requirements and system design: correctness, completeness, achievability, veri>ability, and robustness. Clearly, the requirements governing the system design must be correct and complete in order to satisfy the Need. The requirements must likewise result in a design that is achievable given the allocated project resources. To avoid unreasonable risk, requirements must be such that they can be verified once the system is built. Finally, the requirements should result in a system that is both robust to variations in performance beyond the nominal operating range as well as robust in the presence of reasonable fault conditions.
Given that V&V is a three dimensional problem it is important to study the driving requirements from multiple vantage points to avoid missing something critical.
The following tools and techniques are available for validation, each offering a unique and important viewpoint: Functional Flow Diagrams End-to-end system hctionality (the "width" dimension of the V&V program) can be studied with functional flow diagrams as shown in Figure 2 . The exercise of understanding the logical flow between project elements from front-end to back-end offers insight into adequacy of interface requirements and overall system utility. In addition to addressing hardware/software aspects, functional flow diagrams are also important for studying operational processes and the requirements placed on them, particularly for human-machine interactions and fault response.
Performance Error Budgets Likewise, comprehensive error budgets are useful in understanding the top-to-bottom flow of performance requirements and capabilities (addressing the depth dimension of V&V). A simplified example of an error budget from the Kepler planet-detection mission is shown in Figure 5 . The driving Needscience Objective and resulting toplevel system requirements are highlighted. Error budgets also represent an example of the temporal aspect of validation. Early in the project, engineers use error budgets in a topdown mode to sub-allocate performance requirements to the different elements. Then, as the project progresses and design maturity improves, the error budgets are used in a bottom-up mode to predict the expected performance. Improving the fidelity of the error budgets in this fashion is one goal of the model validation effort.
A potential pitfall to watch for in error budgets is the appropriate treatment of correlated, systematic errors versus uncorrelated, random noise. This topic is beyond the scope of this paper, but the performance analyst must be scrupulous in understanding and accounting for the effects of systematic errors and the calibration and error rejection techniques in data-reduction. Carefully accounting for small errors and residuals are necessary to avoid being either over-conservative or too optimistic in estimating overall system performance.
Robustness and Graceful Degradation Projects sometimes make the mistake of unintentionally creating requirements and designs that result in operation at or near "cliffs". While a system may be designed to meet performance specifications within a fairly tight set of tolerances around a required central value, it may fail precipitously in the event of relatively minor excursions from the region of nominal operation. The concept of graceful degradation is key to successfully implementing deep-space systems in the faster, better, cheaper environment. Properly executed validation programs enable graceful degradation by using performance sensitivity analyses and design risk analyses to identify cliffs and soft-spot, thus providing the project sufficient insight to guide risk versus cost (mitigating action) trades.
Performance Sensitivity Analyses Merit Functions and Monte Carlo simulations are two useful tools for assessing the robustness of a system in terms of its overall performance. Monte Carlo simulations are well-described in the literature and can be very helpful for perturbing system parameters such as spacecraft pointing jitter in stressing cases to assess the impact on top-level performance.
Merit Functions are models that provide the system engineer and the customer (such as a Principal Investigator or PI) with a m e~o d of studying the sensitivity of the mission Need to changes in key mission parameters. Another way of thinking about this is: what is the science sensitivity to the mission parameters? As an example, consider the Kepler mission. The PI has identified a Need to determine the frequency of terrestrial planets in the habitable zones of solar-type stars. The quality of the Science produced (i.e., the number of appropriate planets found per star observed) is some function of a few key mission Again, the goal is to deliver a system that is robust to variations in the key mission parameters by remaining in the flat portion of the performance curve. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) are useful tools for assessing the robustness of a system to failure modes. An example of a system-level fault tree (an excerpt from the MER Terminal Descent sequence) is shown in Figure 7 . An FTA is simply an exercise in which the system engineer considers "what has to happen for the mission to succeed" (or conversely, fail) and then de-composes this in a logical fashion. This is very useful in later phases of system validation, particularly test planning. Also, estimated probabilities of success (or failure) -4 -- can be assigned to each key component of a fault tree. This is one method of performing a PRA. Engineers often question the accuracy of PRA since it is limited by the assumptions of the analyst on the reliability of very complex processes. However, if one ignores the absolute values of such numbers and instead focuses on the relative differences, PRA can be very useful in highlighting "soft spots" in the design. One can then consider the application of selected redundancy or additional fault protection features to augment a soft spot and/or specify appropriate stress tests to prove the system is reliable outside the Region of Nominal Operation.
It is fairly standard practice for projects to employ some form of FTA to assess reliability of individual mechanical actuators. Unfortunately, the use of FTA and PRA to study overall system-level robustness is used less consistently. In addition to system-level FTA and PRA, lower-level design risk analyses are necessary to insure integrated system robustness. A companion to F T M R A is the Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). A cognizant engineer for an assembly is responsible for insuring by analysis that failures in that assembly cannot propagate to other assemblies (e.g., a short-circuit condition). FMECA therefore tends to be focused on the interfaces between project elements. FMECAs, when combined properly with system FTNPRA, help insure the objective of fault containment is met.
As previously mentioned, Worst-case Analysis (WCA) is frequently employed to insure operation of a particular unit such as an electronic board is robust in the presence of stressing conditions. At even lower levels, individual components are subjected to Parts Stress Analysis (PSA) which are often supplanted by margin tests on the as-built higher-level assembly.
Early Hardware/Software Testing When performance sensitivity analyses and design risk analyses identify a potential cliff or soft spot, it is often prudent to perform early tests using engineering model hardware and/or software testbeds to confirm such predictions and/or assess mitigating designs. The uses of models in requirements validation were described above. For the later phases of V&V, models are often used to "bridge the gaps" in the system verification and validation effort that cannot be directly tested. Some models (or certain aspects of them) should be considered mission-critical if errors in such areas could mask problems leading to failures in the operations phase of the project. As shown in another finding from the MPL Mishap In a cost-constrained project, the following minimum approach should be used to identify and validate mission-critical models and simulations:
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In practice there are several limitations to this concept, chief among them: the final form of the system being modeled does not yet exist in the early phases of the project when the model is being used for requirements validation. This situation can often be remedied later in the project when the real system is undergoing test and can be used to support model evolution, although care must be taken to isolate noise induced by test artifacts from inherent system noise when making comparisons. In the early phase of the project, such model comparisons with real systems can sometimes be accomplished by modifying the model's capabilities to describe a similar existing system (thus validation by similarity).
Again, project costs can be managed by limiting formal validation efforts to those aspects of models deemed mission-critical. Even so, achieving perfect model credibility is typically an unattainable goal within the project cost constraints. The system engineer must establish what level of credibility is sufficient to meet the needs and balance that against model cost and utility requirements. One may decide that project resources are better invested in more comprehensive testing rather than expending additional funds providing an incremental improvement in the credibility and utility of a particular model. The generic relationship between model credibility, utility, and cost is depicted in Figure 9 .12
Even if requirements and model validation result in a design that shouEd meet the ultimate Need, the steps of verification and system validation are required to prove the as-built system in fact does meet those requirements and satisfy the ultimate Need. While the process of verification is well-established in the aerospace community, there are two pitfalls which can impact a verification program and must be avoided. First, the use of un-validated models in covering missioncritical gaps in a testing program is very risky. The quality-assurance concept of using an independent reviewer for verifying a requirement by inspection should apply equally to verification by analysis/modeling. Second, while testing is the most robust method of verification, poorly designed tests can miss problems, provide a false sense of security, and even damage or over-stress hardware, resulting in failures during operations. It is therefore imperative that test plans be independently reviewed prior to execution, tests are conducted by qualified personnel in a buddy-system environment (in which more than one person understands the true intent of the test), and that test reports are critically reviewed by the system engineer to ensure the as-run test did indeed verify compliance with the requirement. The minimum size (lowest cost) of a V&V team is that which ensures there are no reasonable single-point-failures in terms of the integration and test team missing something critical.
Another related concept is that of the incompressible test list which identifies the minimum set of tests that must be performed prior to certain project milestones such as launch, regardless of schedule and budget pressures. Once established, any changes to this list must be approved by system engineering and project management.
As mentioned previously, validation does not follow the same well-established policies as verification. When starting to put together a system validation matrix, the engineer may cost struggle with "how to start?". However, the same techniques discussed above in the section on Requirements Validation can be applied in generating such a matrix, which will define what validation tests are performed.
Validation should include Operational Readiness Tests (ORTs) which assess how the end-to-end system will really perform when all the flight and ground hardware, software, people, and operational procedures come together. Cross-system compatibility tests or "scrimmages" to validate things such as flightground interfaces are useful pre-cursors and complementary activities to ORTs. Another key component of system validation is stress testing and simulation, in which system robustness to variations in performance and fault conditions are assessed. The Region of Robust Operation in Figure 6 depicts the space over which system performance should be tested. Likewise, the results from system FTA and PRA should guide the definition of Mission Scenario Tests, which include fault The importance for such stress testing and simulation was cited in the WIRE failure report: "Testing only for correct functional behavior should be augmented with signijkant effort in testing for anomalous behavior ". l 3 Likewise from the MPL mishap report: "The flight sofiare was not subjected to complete fault-injection testing. System software testing must include stress testing and fault injection in a suitable simulation environment to determine the limits of capability and search for hidden flaws".' Some projects rightly claim they cannot do full fault-injection testing with the flight system without incurring excessive risks or costs. However, the solution is to invest in software testbeds to do this. Again, an early V&V Plan can identify the needs for such testing and the required testbed capabilities.
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) has captured several decades of lessons-learned in deep-space mission implementation in a set of Design Principles and Flight Project Practices, which in addition to the V&V principles already discussed, address the following.
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1) Perform a Mission Design Verification
Test (MDVT) to validate the end-toend flight-ground system by covering mission-enabling scenarios (e.g., science operations, trajectory correction maneuver, safing, cruise). 2) As a minimum, perform validation of the launch sequence and early flight operations on the flight vehicle using the launch version of flight software. Changes made to the system to address issues found during testing must be reverified by regression testing. 10) Verification by visual inspection, particularly for mechanical clearances and margins (e.g. potential reduced clearances after blanket expansion in vacuum), must be performed on the final as-built hardware before and after environmental tests. 11) Verification of all deployable or movable appendages and mechanisms must include full-range articulation. 12)The navigation design must be validated by peer review by independent subject matter experts. 13) Mission operations capabilities (e.g., flight sequences, commandtelemetry data bases, displays) must be employed in system testing of the flight system.
V&V Checklist
In summary, by combining the principles outlined in this paper, system engineers can use the following "checklist" to guide V&V efforts. 
Conclusions
It is certainly possible to implement relatively low-cost, fast-paced missions without taking excessive risks, but doing so requires that projects commit to following some form of rigorous Validation and Verification program. While there is no "one size fits all" V&V program, projects should follow some minimum set of guiding principles such as those described in this paper when selecting an appropriate cost-risk balance. 
